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8

ARGUMENT

I.

Argenziano Has Statutory Standing.

The Rellers argue Argenziano does not have standing, citing three tests from Wade
v. Burke, 131 Utah Adv. Rep. 94, 800 P.2d 1106 (Utah App. 1990). Appellees' Br. p.p. 6
- 9. However, it is those "who [have] not been granted standing to sue by statute" that
must show standing under these common law tests. T.H. v. R.C (In re E.H.), 2006 UT
36, ^|49, 137 P.3d 809, citing Wash. County Water Conservancy Dist v. Morgan, 2003
UT 58, ^[17, 82 P.3d 1125. The Rellers ironically claim Argenziano is the Child's
biological father and can be adjudicated as her legal father, yet at the same time assert he
has no standing. That argument fails because the Utah Uniform Paternity Act ("UPA")
grants Argenziano standing to sue. Therefore, the three tests the Rellers rely on are
irrelevant.
The Rellers neglect to direct this Court to Section 602 of the UPA, which is
entitled "Standing to maintain proceeding." It provides that "a proceeding to adjudicate
parentage may be maintained by . . . (3) a man whose paternity of the child is to be
adjudicated." Utah Code Ann. §78B-15-602 (2011).1 On October 23, 2007, Karine
Reller filed her Petition to Modify and sought to re-adjudicate parentage to name

j

As part of a 2008 recodification of the Judicial Code, the UPA was renumbered to
Chapter 15 of Title 78B, with section numbers remaining unchanged. For example §7845g-602 has been renumbered and is now located at Utah Code Ann. §78B-15-602
(2011). Because there are no significant changes, citations to the UPA are to the current
2011 version.
1
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Argenziano as the father. R. 139 -141; see R. 267, % 5 (Trial Court finding that
"[rjespondent seeks to undo the adjudication of paternity . . . " ) . Thus, Karine Reller made
Argenziano a "man whose paternity of the child is to be adjudicated" under Section 602,
which gave him standing. By then, Micah Reller had long been adjudicated the Child's
father ( R. 266 ^2), but //the Trial Court still had jurisdiction to redetermine parentage,
the UPA specified that Argenziano "shall be joined as [a party]." Utah Code Ann. §78B15-603 (2011) (emphasis added).
Both Rellers re-upped that basis when they tried to set aside the Adjudication of
parentage contained in their Decree of Divorce by stipulating to set that Decree aside.
While Argenziano has always maintained that the Rellers could not re-adjudicate the
Child's paternity, it is clear that since 2007, the Rellers have been tiying to do just that, by
having Argenziano adjudicated as the "Child's" father. See Appellees' Br. p. 17 (still
arguing for Argenziano's adjudication as the father). As a result, Argenziano intervened
in this case, which intervention has not been appealed. See R. 420, 602 - 608.
The existence of statutory standing is a question of statutory interpretation.
Strauss v, Tuschman, 2009 UT App 215, f7, 216 P.3d 370, Here the statute is clear,
Argenziano is a "man whose paternity of the child is to be adjudicated" and he has
standing. If one has statutory standing, the common law standing tests are inapplicable.

2
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II.

Argenziano Also Has Standing Under the Common Law.2

Argenziano also has standing under the Wade case the Rellers cite, as well as more
recent case law on standing:
On appeal, a party whose standing is challenged must show that he or she had
standing under the traditional test in the original proceeding before the district
court. In addition, an appellant generally must show both that he or she was a party
. . . to the action below and that he or she is aggrieved by that court's judgment.
Chen v. Stewart, «|50, 2005 UT 68, 123 P.3d 416, 431.
First, Argenziano was a party below by virtue of his joinder by Karine Reller and
then later by his intervention. Second, Argenziano is aggrieved because, initially, the
Trial Court adjudicated Micah Reller as the father of the Child as part of the Rellers'
divorce decree. R. 266 - 267. This precluded Argenziano from being adjudicated the
father. Argenziano is aggrieved by the orders he appeals from because, on their face, they
overrule that prior Adjudication. This aggrieves Argenziano by exposing him to being
adjudicated as the father. Thus, Argenziano has standing to bring this appeal if he can
demonstrate standing in the court below. Chen, supra.
In addition to a key statute, the Rellers overlook more recent case law. The Rellers
cite Wade v. Burke, 800 P.2d 1106 (Utah App. 1990) for its three tests for standing. But
any one of the tests is sufficient (Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Bd.,

2

Out of an abundance of caution, and because the Rellers standing analysis is
sparse, Argenziano feels he must also address the Rellers' common law standing
arguments.
3
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2006 UT 74, ]f41, 148 P.3d 960) and Argenziano has standing under the first test.
The first test requires showing "a distinct and palpable injury that gives him or her
a personal stake in the outcome of the legal dispute." Appellees' Br. p. 7 quoting Wade,
1991 [sic] UT App 60, | 9 . However, an injury need not be actual, or even imminent, to
establish standing. Brown v. Div. of Water Rights of the Dep't of Natural Res. of Utah,
2010 UT 14, Tfl8, 228 P.3d 747. A "potential' injury" - one with a reasonable probability
of future injury - is sufficient. Brown, 2010 UT ^ 18-19 (quoting Cedar Mountain
Environmental Inc. v. Tooele County, 2009 UT 48, ^f 9, 214 P.3d 95). Argenziano's
injuries are much greater than just a reasonable probability. If the September 12, 2006.
Adjudication of parentage can be properly set aside, Argenziano could be adjudicated the
Child's father. That is a potential injury, it is very likely, and it amply satisfies the injury
prong.
The Rellers then assert Argenziano "does not claim a statutory or common law
protectable [sic] interest." Appellees' Br. p. 8, citing Jones v. Barlow, 2007 UT 26, 154
P.3d 808. The UPA of course says otherwise. Even if its grant of standing were not
explicit, Section 602 and 603 make Argenziano's interest a statutorily protectible one by
giving him the right to bring an action and providing that he must be joined if an action is
going to determine paternity. Utah Code Ann. §§78B-15-602, 603 (2011).
The Rellers' divorce encompassed a parentage adjudication. Where a child is born
into a marriage, if parentage had not been previously adjudicated, the UPA requires it be

4
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done in the divorce. Utah Code Ann. §78B-15-607(1) (2011). Furthermore, if a man's
paternity of a child is going to be adjudicated, he "shall be joined as part[y] in a
proceeding to adjudicate parentage." Utah Code Ann. §78B-15-603 (2011) (emphasis
added). Thus, the UPA itself seems to make Argenziano a necessary party in the Rellers'
divorce if either of them were going to assert Argenziano is the father. Clearly this gives
Argenziano a statutory "legally protectible interest" under Jones v. Barlow.
The Rellers also argue Argenziano's interest is not a protectible one because "[n]o
statute confers a right to a third party to seek readjudication of paternity . . . or that an
outsider may set aside a Decree of Divorce." Appellees' Br. p. 8 (emphasis added). This
argument is made of whole cloth because neither Argenziano, nor the Rellers have a right
to re-adjudicate paternity. But, it is the Rellers, not Argenziano that would re-adjudicate
paternity. Argenziano has always maintained that Micah Reller was and is the Child's
adjudicated father.
The Rellers argue Argenziano lost his protectible interest because he objected to
his joinder and claimed he had no interest in this matter. Appellees' Br. p. 8. Yet nothing
supports the contention that Argenziano asserted he had no interest in this matter. The
Trial Court did vacate Argenziano's joinder, but his motion to vacate was based on the
prior adjudication of parentage, that the Child already had a father, that the UPA barred re
adjudicating parentage after so long, and that genetic testing was now inadmissible. R.
161-167. Nowhere did Argenziano assert he did not have an interest.

5
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As to not later seeking an interest in this case, what the Rellers omit is that they
never gave notice to Argenziano when they filed their Stipulation to Set Aside Decree of
Divorce and their Order Setting Aside Decree of Divorce. R. 260 - 265. They did this
before the trial judge signed the order vacating Argenziano's joinder.3 Compare R. 206 265 with R. 268. So Argenziano did not know of their activities. But, if the Order
Setting Aside Decree of Divorce had the effect of setting aside the Adjudication,
parentage was again at issue in the Rellers' divorce. At that point, the Rellers were
arguably obligated to join Argenziano back into the divorce. Utah Code Ann. §78B-15603 (2011) supra.
The Rellers' argument that Argenziano claimed no interest sounds like a waiver
argument. But standing triggers subject matter jurisdiction. Utah Chapter of the Sierra
Club v. Utah Air Quality Bel., 2006 UT 74, ^[13. Generally subject matter jurisdiction may
not be waived by the court or the parties. Utah Dep't of Business Regulation, Div. of Pub.
Wis. v. Public Serv. Comm% 602 P.2d 696, 699 (Utah 1979). So, even if the Rellers'
contentions were true, it is difficult to see how standing was waived.
In sum, Argenziano has standing. He was and is a party here with a legally
protectible interest. If the September 12, 2006 Adjudication of parentage were set aside,
Argenziano could be adjudicated the father, giving him a personal stake in the matter.

3

August 14, 2008 is the date the Trial Court Docket shows Argenziano was
removed as a party and the date the Trial Court signed the order vacating Argenziano's
joinder.
6
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III.

The Trial Court Did Not Have Jurisdiction to Set Aside a Parentage
Adjudication That Was Made Years Ago in a Divorce Decree.

The recurring theme in the Rellers' arguments is that parentage was not
adjudicated in their Decree. This premise is incorrect and so the Rellers' arguments fail.
A.

The Rellers' Divorce Decree Adjudicated the Child's Parentage.

The Rellers argue that "[a]n adjudication by a Court requires more than mere
adoption of a stipulation, it requires the receipt of evidence and fact finding by the
Court." Appellees' Br. p.10, relying on Phillips v. Jackson, 615 P.2d 1228 (Utah 1980).
But the Rellers greatly misconstrue Phillips, which simply does not stand for that
proposition. Phillips was actually referring to adjudication as the process of taking and
weighing conflicting evidence in a context far removed from the facts here. From that
misconception they come to the conclusion that "[a] stipulated Default Decree of Divorce
does not constitute an adjudication." Appellees' Br. p. 10.
Phillips was a pre-UPA case involving the evidentiary foundation for the HLA
test, a new test at the time whose admissibility had only been addressed by a few courts.
Phillips, 615 P.2d at 1232. The Utah Supreme Court was most concerned that the HLA
test would be widely used without adequate foundation, and held that it had been admitted
"without proper foundation." Phillips, 615 P.2d at 1238.
The Rellers apparently rely on Phillips because it uses the terms "adjudication"
and "paternity," but they do so out of context. The actual sentence is: "Adjudication
means fact finding, and while speculation is not legitimate in that process, a trier of fact
7
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

should not be deprived of scientific data because some controversy attaches to it."
Phillips, 615 P.2d at 1235. Phillips was talking about adjudication in the sense of
litigating and trying a case in the fact-finding stage of a trial. The Rellers morph this
language, about the admissibility of scientific evidence at trial, to conclude that a default
decree of divorce cannot be an adjudication. Phillips, however, had nothing to do with
whether paternity can be adjudicated by default or stipulation without the taking of
evidence.
In fact, the UPA specifically provides that paternity can be adjudicated without the
taking of evidence. It provides that defaults in paternity actions fall under Utah R. Civ. P.
55. Utah Code Ann. §78B-15-111 (2011). It also mandates that a court "shall issue an
order adjudicating the paternity of a man who . . . is in default." Id. §78B-15-620(1). So
the UPA uses the term "adjudicating" in the sense of entering judgment, rather than the
process of trial. See Black's Law Dictionary 20 (Abridged 5th ed. 1987) (defining
adjudication as "the formal giving or pronouncing a judgment..."). Both the UPA and
the Trial Court below use "adjudication" in the entry ofjudgment sense, not the process
by which a judgment is arrived. See Larsen v. Collina, 684 P,2d 52, 56 (Utah 1984) (a
pre - UPA case in which the Court discussed the advisability of tests, but stated "[w]e do
not mean to suggest that default judgments cannot be entered in paternity cases without
blood tests").
The Rellers then cite Elmer v. Elmer, 116 P.2d 599 (Utah 1989) for the proposition

8
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that stipulated divorce decrees and default decrees "are not to be considered adjudicated
for a myriad of reasons." Appellees' Br. p. 10. That, however, misapplies Elmer, which
was specifically addressing a stipulated custody order. Elmer does not stand for the
proposition that default decrees are not adjudications. In Elmer (and Phillips) Justice
Stewart was using the term "adjudicated" in the sense of the adjudicatory or trial process,
and noted that "custody decrees are not always adjudicated, and when they are not, the res
judicata policy underlying the changed-circumstances rule is at a particularly low ebb."
Elmer v. Elmer, 776 P.2d at 603. He did not say that custody decrees that result from
stipulations are not adjudications. Here, there are no "changed circumstances" and Elmer
does not stand for the proposition that a default paternity adjudication is not an
adjudication.
Egan v. Egan, 560 P.2d 704 (UT 1977), for example, shows that default decrees do
adjudicate paternity. There, the parties were divorced by stipulated default while the wife
was expecting a child. The decree determined the now ex-husband was the father of that
expected child. After the child was bom, a test, which was not available pre-birth,
established he was not the father. The ex-husband had to bring an independent action to
set aside that part of the decree that had adjudicated paternity. Relief was granted
because in 1977, pre -UPA, mistake of fact was a possible grounds for relief. But he had
to bring that action because the default decree was an adjudication of paternity.
The Rellers' position also directly contradicts the Rellers' Decree, which uses the

9
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language "it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:... " R. 77
(emphasis in original, attached as Appendix A). It also contradicts the Trial Court's later
ruling, made after the issue was briefed and argued, which stated:
Petitioner [Micah Reller] was adjudicated as the child's father at the entry
of the parties' Decree of Divorce on or about September 12, 2006, pursuant
to §78-45g-623(3) of the Utah Code.
R. 266-267 (Appendix B).
The Rellers' position is also directly refuted by Utah Code Ann. §78B-15-620
(2011), which specifically provides for a default adjudications of paternity as well as
Section 111, which applies "Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 55, Default Judgment" to
paternity actions. Id. §78B-15 All; see also Id. §78B-15-201 (2)(a) ("father-child
relationship is established . . . by: (a) an unrebutted presumption of the man's paternity of
the child under Section 78B-15-204").
Finally, the Rellers argue "[t]he Court merely applied the marital presumption of
paternity set forth in Utah Code Ann. §78B-15-201 (2008), adopted the agreement of the
parties and signed the Decree of Divorce without adjudicating said issue." Appellees' Br.
p. 11. But Micah Reller filed a petition for divorce claiming the Child was "bom of this
marriage." The UPA mandates that a court "shall issue an order adjudicating whether a
man alleged or claiming to be the father is the parent of the child." Utah Code Ann.
§78B-15-622 (2011). The Trial Court did just that on September 12, 2006, in its Decree
of Divorce, which adjudicated Micah Reller as the Child's father. R. 265 - 267.

10
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B.

Appellees Erroneously Claim They Were Not Estopped From
Challenging Parentage Because There Was No Adjudication Under
theUPA.

The Rellers concede they would be estopped if the issue of parentage had been
adjudicated, but deny it was. This time, the Rellers argue the UPA requires the tribunal to
"adjudicate^ according to Part 6 'Adjudication of Parentage', of the UPA." Appellees'
Br. p. 11. But the Rellers focus only on Section 617, which relates to genetic testing, and
Section 112. From this the Rellers infer that "fact finding is necessary to constitute an
adjudication." Appellees' Br. p. 12. The analytical error is that, although such
adjudications of paternity must be made according to Part 6, not all its provisions apply in
every case.
The Rellers argue that "[a]t the time the original Decree was set aside, there had
been no evidence of genetic testing presented to the court proving or disproving Appellee
Micah Reller as father." Appellees' Br. p. 12. But Section 617 does not require proof
here. It states that "paternity of a child having a presumed . . . father may be disproved
only by admissible results of genetic testing excluding [him]." Utah Code Ann. §78B-15617(l)(a) (2011) (emphasis added). Section 617 does not require genetic testing to prove
parentage, especially where the husband has alleged he is the father. Nothing more than
the presumption is needed. See Utah R. Evid. 301(a) and Comment (fact is established if
"[i]f evidence to rebut a presumption has not been admitted").
The Rellers' reliance on Section 112's clear and convincing evidence standard is

11
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also misplaced. Part 6 specifically permits default adjudications and so default
adjudications are made according to Part 6. Utah Code Ann. §78B-15-620 (2011).
Section 112, however, sets "the standard of proof in a trial to determine paternity." Id.
§78B-15-112 (emphasis added). It does not apply to defaults under Part 6.
What the Rellers ignore is Section 607, which applies to children born to married
couples. It specifies that "[t]he presumption may be rebutted by genetic test results that
exclude the presumed father." Id. §78B-15-607(3). But "[i]f the question of paternity has
been raised in the pleadings in a divorce and the tribunal addresses the issue and enters an
order, the parties are estopped from raising the issue again, and the order of the tribunal
may not be challenged on the basis of material mistake of fact." Utah Code Ann.
§78B-15-607(l)(a)(2011).
Moreover, Section 607 sets out procedural routes the Rellers could have followed,
but did not. It provides that "[i]f the issue is raised prior to the adjudication, genetic
testing may be ordered by the tribunal." Utah Code Ann. §78B-15-607(l)(a) (2011). But
Micah Reller never requested genetic testing before the Adjudication. Once the
Adjudication entered on September 12, 2006, Micah Reller was faced with Section 607's
provision that there was no presumption to rebut. Id. §607(4). At that stage, both Rellers
were also faced with Section 607fs estoppel provision, and their review options were
limited to appeal or vacation of the default judgment. Utah Code Ann. §78B-15-623(1)
and (6) (2011).
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The Rellers have little choice but to argue that their later challenge of the
Adjudication was not based on mistake of fact. They apparently contend that parties can
agree to do anything they want. Appellees' Br. p. 11. That, of course, is incorrect. But
the natural question is still "on what basis was the judgment being challenged?" Micah
Reliefs verified petition alleged essentially that he was the Child's father. He prevailed
on that assertion. Judicial estoppel should preclude Micah from claiming non parentage
now. Cafe Rio, Inc. v. Larkin-Gifford-Overton, 2009 UT 27, ^f42, 207 P.3d 1235.
C.

The Trial Court Could Not Properly Set Aside the Original
Adjudication in the Rellers' Divorce Decree.

The Rellers argue the Trial Court retained jurisdiction to set aside its Adjudication
of parentage as "requested in Appellees' Stipulation to Set Aside Decree of Divorce" by
citing an unpublished memorandum decision, Bryner v. Bryner, 2009 Ut App. 217
(Attached as Appendix C). Appellees' Br. p. 13. But Bryner does not involve setting
aside a parentage adjudication. Bryner holds that parties may not "stipulate away a
court's jurisdiction." That parallels the rule that lack of subject matter jurisdiction may
not be cured by stipulation. Barton v. Barton, 2001 UT App 199, ^[12, 29 P.3d 13. Those
concepts, however, support Argenziano's assertion that the Trial Court did not have
jurisdiction in 2007 to set aside the Adjudication in the Rellers' Decree.
Next the Rellers improperly invoke Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 60(b)(6). Appellees' Br.
p.p. 13-15. "Improperly" because, although they argue it, the Rellers never filed a Rule
60(b) motion of any kind - ever. And they never hinted to the Trial Court that Rule 60(b)
13
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was the basis for their stipulation to set aside the Decree. See R. generally.
Recently in WCFv. Argonaut Insurance, 2011 UT 61, 261 P.3d 102, the Utah
Supreme Court addressed similar claims that a 60(b) motion had been filed. In that case,
Argonaut filed an "objection" seeking relief from a judgment, but never referred to the
rules on which it relied. The trial court denied relief On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court
rejected Argonaut's claim that its objection could be treated as a Rule 59 or 60(b) motion.
It held that where 60(b) motions were concerned, form matters and failure to specify the
rule was fatal. Argonaut's objection was not a 60(b) motion, because it "was neither
captioned as a rule 60(b) motion nor did it cite to rule 60 or any other authority."
Argonaut, ^[14. Moreover, it did not refer to any of the Rule 60(b) circumstances that
would justify relief. Id. The Rellers'stipulation suffers similar deficiencies. R. 260. It
refers to no basis in Rule 60(b) that would justify relief Like Argonaut, the Rellers "did
not file a rule 60(b) motion." Argonaut, f 15.
The Rellers reliance on Richins v. Delbert, Chipman, & Sons, 817 P. 2d 382 (Utah
App. 1991) is completely misplaced. See Appellees' Br. p. 14. Richins stands for the
proposition that a trial court cannot revisit its own decisions after the time limits of Rule
60(b) have passed. In Richins, one of the parties (Chipman) claimed "he mistakenly
entered into an ill-advised stipulation without fully understanding its consequences" and
so 15 months after judgment entered he sought relief under Rule 60(b). Richins, 817 P.
2d at 386. The trial court ruled that it "lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion because
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it was not filed until long after the three month period prescribed by Rule 60(b)(1)."
Richins, 817 P.2d at 384. On appeal, Chipman argued Rule 60(b) (5-7) applied because
relief on those bases could be brought within a "reasonable time." The strategy did not
escape notice and this Court rejected Chipman's arguments. It held that Chipman could
not invoke the "residuary clause," to circumvent other specific applicable provisions of
Rule 60(b). Richins, 817 P.2d at 387. Consequently, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
consider an untimely Rule 60(b) motion "and would have erred had it done so." Id.
Argonaut and Richins suggest the same result here. The Rellers never advised the
Trial Court that they were seeking relief under Rule 60(b). So their stipulation was not a
60(b) motion. In fact, their stipulation avoided even mentioning their real purpose setting aside the Adjudication of paternity. They only admit this in their brief on appeal,
when they state "Micah believed Appellee Karine's conduct to constitute a fraud upon
him and the Court." Appellees' Br. p. 14. But even if that were a valid basis for relief, it
had to be brought within three months under Rule 60(b)(3), which covers "fraud . . .
misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party." Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3). As
in Richins, the Trial Court lost jurisdiction after three months, well before the Rellers
filed their stipulation.
D.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction to Set Aside or Re-Adjudicate an
Adjudication of Paternity Does not Exist Forever.

The Rellers' fundamental error is assuming that a court has jurisdiction to revisit
an issue years later if it once had jurisdiction to initially enter a judgment. Here the
15
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Rellers quote, but misunderstand Johnson v. Johnson, 2010 UT 28, 234 P.3d 1100.
Appellees' Br. p. 15.)
In Johnson, the parties believed they were married and filed for divorce, which
was granted. Years later the respondent filed a Rule 60(b) motion, asserting the district
court did not have jurisdiction to divorce them because the parties were never married.
The trial court agreed, but ruled the respondent estopped because his actions prevented
the petitioner from timely filing a "common law" marriage action.
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that the district court did have
jurisdiction even though the parties were never married. It noted that "the concept of
subject matter jurisdiction relates to 'the relationship between the claim and the forum
that allows for the exercise ofjurisdiction.'" Johnson, 2010 UT 28, f9 (quoting Chen v.
Stewart, 2004 UT 82, f 35). The claim involved marriage, the district court had the
power to decide that class of cases and so it had jurisdiction. The question here though is
not whether, but how long a court has jurisdiction over a case it has already decided. The
Rellers do not analyze it and so miss the mark.
District courts are vested with jurisdiction to decide divorces under the Utah
Constitution. That is a class of case, and jurisdiction exists apart from the specifics of the
case. Contracts for example are also a class of case. A district court does not lose subject
matter jurisdiction over a contract case merely because it turns out there was no contract.
E.g. Johnson, 2010 UT 28 f 12. Utah's district courts are also vested by the UPA with
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jurisdiction to decide another class of cases known as parentage adjudications.
But in none of those instances are district courts vested with unfettered neverending jurisdiction to revise those decisions after judgments enter. Re-adjudication or
redetermination of final judgments is simply a different class of case and that is not a
matter of general jurisdiction. For example, a trial court cannot come back and readjudicate a contract case years later simply because it originally had jurisdiction to (and
did) adjudicate it earlier. If that were so, the jurisdictional lines dividing our appellate
courts and the district courts would become hopelessly blurred. Rule 60(b) and 59 would
be meaningless, and Richins, for example, could not have been decided as it was.
True, there are circumstances where statute confers continuing jurisdiction. For
example, in divorces, statute grants district courts some "continuing jurisdiction"
regarding the custody of children and their support. Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(3) (2011).
But these grants of continuing jurisdiction make the point. Jurisdiction to initially
adjudicate a class of case is not jurisdiction to re-determine them. That is a different class
of case, which requires a specific grant of jurisdiction.
No such grant exists for adjudications of parentage. In fact, the UPA specifically
sets forth the parameters for re-adjudicating parentage. See Utah Code Ann. §78B-15623(6) (2011) (party to parentage adjudication may then challenge it only under laws
"relating to appeal, vacation of judgments, or other judicial review); see also Richins,
supra, (court loses jurisdiction to reconsider after Rule 60(b) time limits pass).
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Johnson v. Johnson, cites a Texas case, Johnson v. Ventling, 132 S.W.3d 173 (Tex.
App. 2004). Johnson, 2010 UT 28, ^[11. Ventling explains that jurisdiction to re-decide a
judgment does not extend indefinitely. In Ventling the parties stipulated to a divorce.
Several years later, as part of a motion for judicial recision of the decree, the parties
entered into a "judicial stipulation . . . that the parties were never married" and the trial
court dismissed the case. Ventling, 132 S.W.3d at 176. Months later Johnson asked the
trial court to vacate that dismissal.
On appeal, a key issue was whether the trial court had lost jurisdiction ("plenary
power") to redetermine its first judgment and dismiss the case. The Court of Appeals of
Texas held that the trial court lost jurisdiction shortly after the decree entered:
A trial court retains plenary power to grant a new trial or to vacate, modify,
correct, or reform a judgment within thirty days after the judgment is signed
. . . If no party to a judgment files a motion that extends the trial court's
plenary power, the trial court loses plenary power over the judgment thirty
days after the judgment is signed.
Ventling, 132 S.W3d at 178 (internal citations omitted). Neither party did anything to
"extendfj the trial court's plenary power" and so after 30 days the trial court lost the
power to alter or modify the original decree. Id. at 179,
In Butler v. Brownlee, 152 Mont. 453, 451 P.2d 836 (1969) (Appendix D ), the
state of Montana addressed a case very similar to the one here, and found that a trial
court's "jurisdiction on the issue of parentage of the minor children became exhausted
upon entry of the original divorce decree." In Butler, the plaintiff husband was granted a
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default divorce with the decree naming two children bom as issue of the marriage. Years
later the husband alleged the children were not his. The trial court enter a modified
decree that "there were no children born as issue of subject marriage;" the Montana
Supreme Court reversed. Butler, 451 P.2d at 837 (Mont 1969); id. at 838 - 839
Vending and Butler are strikingly similar to this case. After the Rellers' Decree
entered on September 12, 2006, if they wanted to modify its Adjudication of parentage,
the Rellers could appeal, or act through the Trial Court. But either route required timely
action and they did neither. Critically here, they took no action that would extend the
Trial Court's jurisdiction, such as a motion under Rule 59 or Rule 60(b). Consequently,
the Trial Court lost jurisdiction. Richins, supra. That lack of jurisdiction was not cured
by the parties' stipulation. Barton v. Barton, 2001 UT App. 199 ^12.
Utah subscribes to the concepts set forth in Ventling and Butler - that is that trial
courts lose jurisdiction if Rules 59 or 60 are not invoked. National Advertising Co. v.
Murray City Corporation, 2006 UT App 75,131 P. 3d 872. In National this Court had
earlier affirmed the defendant's counterclaim judgment and remanded the case. After
remand, the defendant asked to amend its counterclaim without first seeking relief from
the affirmed judgment under Rule 59 or 60(b). The trial court allowed amendment and
the defendant obtained judgment on the amended counterclaim. On the second appeal,
this Court vacated that judgment, holding that the trial court was without jurisdiction to
allow the amendment:
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[BJecause the defendant's Motion for Leave to Amend was untimely under rules
59 and 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, we hold the trial court was without
jurisdiction to grant the Crawfords' Motion for Leave to Amend and thus lacked
the authority to enter judgment based on the Crawfords' amended counterclaim.
National Advertising, 2006 UT App 75, ^[27.
National Advertising, Butler and Vending demonstrate similar (and universal)
concepts. A trial court's jurisdiction ends when judgment enters, or shortly thereafter.
That jurisdiction may be extended by timely filing an appropriate motion. In Utah,
however, absent a statute granting continuing jurisdiction, or the filing of a timely motion
under Rule 59 or 60(b), the trial court loses jurisdiction after judgment enters. The
Rellers never took timely action in the Trial Court and it lost jurisdiction to modify or readjudicate the Adjudication of parentage.
For the same reasons, the Rellers' are not helped by Baby E.Z v. T.I.Z, which holds
that "[a] court has subject matter jurisdiction when it has the authority . . . to decide the
case," Appellees' Br p. 15 (quoting Baby EZ, 2011 UT 38, ^ 0 , 687 Utah Adv. Rep.
17). Likewise, they are not helped by the UPA's vesting the district courts with the
authority to decide parentage matters. The competence to decide that class of case does
not ipso facto confer a perpetual jurisdiction to re-decide that case later.
Indeed, the UPA specifically limits how, when, and by whom parentage
adjudications may be challenged - especially where married parents are involved. E.g.
Utah Code Ann. §§78B-15- 607(l)(a) and 623(6) (2011). So the Rellers miss the point
when they state "[n]o statute, including the Utah Parentage Act, limits the authority to
20
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decide paternity matters." Appellees' Br. p. 16. Once an adjudication has been made,
redeterminations of paternity matters are very much limited by the UP A- especially where
the child is born to a married couple.
In short, the Rellers confuse the divorce court's jurisdiction to adjudicate
parentage in the first instance with jurisdiction to revise that adjudication. The two are
not the same. Jurisdiction to first adjudicate parentage is granted by the UP A, whereas
jurisdiction to revise that adjudication is subject to the time constraints of Rule 60(b).
The Rellers did not file a 60(b) motion (or anything else) timely, and the Trial Court lost
jurisdiction.
E.

The Rellers' Argument That They Were Not Estopped is Based on a False
Premise.

The Rellers apparently concede that if there was an adjudication of paternity as a
part of the Decree of Divorce, they would be barred by res judicata from raising the issue
again. Appellees' Br. p. 16 -17. But rather than address that doctrine directly they simply
reargue their claim that there never was an adjudication. Here res judicata results from
the interplay between the pleadings filed by Micah Reller, the provisions of the UPA and
the final Decree of Divorce entered on September 12, 2006.
Clearly, however, res judicata applies. The case of Campos v. Campos, 523 P.2d
1235 (Utah 1974) (Appendix E) is illustrative. In Campos the wife filed for divorce and
the husband did not answer. A hearing was held, after which the court awarded custody
of the two children to the wife. Much later the husband filed a petition to modify,
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alleging one of the children had been fathered by another man. That petition was denied
and the husband appealed. Although the Utah Supreme Court did not use the term res
judicata, it did deny the husband's appeal, noting that he was attempting to set aside the
decree long after the time for appeal had run. Campos, 523 P.2d at 1236. The salient
point is that, before the decree had entered, the husband had not raised the issue of
paternity, but had acquiesced on that issue. Campos, 523 P.2d at 1236. Accordingly, in
the sense of taking evidence on the issue, court's paternity determination in Campos was
akin to the stipulated or default adjudication at issue here. That is, paternity was not
"adjudicated" as the Rellers would have this Court apply the term. Nonetheless, the Utah
Supreme Court held the trial court's determination of paternity was final. Obviously
paternity was "adjudicated" by the entry of an order establishing parentage. Egan v.
Egan, 560 P.2d 704 (UT 1977) {supra., independent action required to set aside default
paternity determination); see also Butler v. Brownlee, 152 Mont. 453, 451 P.2d 836
(1968) (supra., where default decree stated children were born as issue of the marriage,
"paternity becomes res judicata . . . under the original divorce decree").
Here absent rebuttal, UPA Section 201(2)(a) mandates the establishment of the
father child relationship between the man and the child. See Utah Code Ann. §§78B-15201, -204, 607 (2011). Micah did not timely rebut the marital presumption of paternity
and the issue of parentage was decided. R. 266 - 267. Micah (and theoretically Karine)
Reller had limited options to appeal or challenge that adjudication. But none of those
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were pursued and so the Trial Court lost jurisdiction to set aside the Decree's
Adjudication of parentage.
IV.

The Rellers' Public Policy Argument is Misplaced,

Without authority or analysis, Rellers argue that this court should reverse centuries
of public policy. Their policy position is narrowly about this case. They argue that
parentage policy should be about "innocent spouses" or someone "invading a marriage."4
But their argument is not about what the law is, but rather about what the law should be
and they do not adequately brief that issue.
Utah's policy has always been otherwise. It favors legitimacy as well as stability
of parentage determinations. So it is simply not good policy to allow married parents to
illegitimize a child years after an adjudication legitimated that child. Perhaps Justice
Crockett has said it best:
If there ever is a situation where the rules of law, the interests of justice, and
sound considerations of policy combine to require the application of the
rules of res judicata, it should be especially so as to the adjudication on the
parenthood of a child.
Roche v. Roche, 596 P.2d 647, 649 (Utah 1979) (Crockett, J., concurring) (citations
omitted). Policy interests have long "favor[ed] legitimacy." See Pearson v. Pearson,
2008 UT 24, TJ17, 182 P.3d 353 citing Holder v. Holder, 9 Utah 2d 163, 340 P.2d 761,

4

Argenziano objects to the Rellers' characterizations of him, as there is no
evidence that he knew Karine Reller was married (he did not). But no party is a "shiny
penny." Karine Reller was married and knew it. See R. 267. Micah Reller portrays
himself as not having a relationship with the Child but that was a choice he made.
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763 (1959); see Lopes v. Lopes, 30 Utah 2d 393, 518 P.2d 687 (1974) (citing Lord
Mansfield's Rule); see also United States v. Snow, 4 Utah 313, 320 (Utah 1886)
("legitimacy of offspring born during wedlock is presumed").
The UPA preserves "the historic common law presumption in favor of the
legitimacy of children born within marriage." Pearson, 2008 UT 24, ^[44 (supra,
Durham, J. dissenting). The other policy consideration is stability. Historically, courts
have "been very circumspect about permitting a father to illegitimize a child presumed to
be his." Garcia v. Garcia, 1984 Utah LEXIS 983 (Utah Oct. 25, 1984) citing Lopes
(supra). That is all the more true once paternity is established in a marital context. See
Campos, (addressed supra., declining to set aside divorce decree adjudicating the husband
as father).
The Rellers argue that the Utah Legislature could not have intended to make it
more difficult for married parents to challenge paternity. Appellees' Brief p. 20.5 In fact
though, the UPA does make it more difficult for married parents to dispute the legitimacy
of their children - especially once parentage has been adjudicated. First the UPA imposes
a marital presumption, Utah Code Ann. §786-15-204 (2011). Essentially, do nothing
and the husband will be established as the father. See Utah Code Ann. §§78B-15-111, -

5

The Rellers allude to a constitutional claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.
This fails because "the party challenging a statute bears the burden of proving its
invalidity" and they offer no argument. State v. Angilau, 2011 UT 3, f 7, 245 P.3d 745;
see State v. Smith, 2010 Utah App 231, | 2 , 238 P.3d 1103 (appellate courts not a
depository in which to "dump the burden of argument and research").
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204(2), - 620 and Arguments supra. Second, once a divorce adjudicates parentage, the
UPA greatly restricts who may challenge those adjudications and how, with the greater
restrictions falling on the married parents. In fact, Section 607, applies largely if not
almost exclusively to parentage determinations involving married couples. Utah Code
Ann. §78B-15-607 (2011). In short, the UPA does make it more difficult for the married
to illegitimize their children.
The Rellers simply ignore existing policy and focus on its consequences to them.
Policy rightly focuses on society as a whole and not on the individual. Without
meaningful analysis this Court should not reverse public policy.
CONCLUSION

The Stipulated Order Resolving All Outstanding Issues in the Parties' Divorce (the
final order in this case) should be reversed and remanded. This Court should enter rulings
clarifying that on July 11, 2008, when the Trial Court set aside the Rellers' Decree of
Divorce, it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to set aside the adjudication of
parentage. The remand should direct the Trial Court to enter an order that Micah Reller is
confirmed as the Child's adjudicated father.
DATED this 14th day of November, 2011.
McjMYRE & GO^DfeN, P.C.

RICHARD RTGOLDEN
JAMES A. NkdOTYRE
Attorneys for Appellant,
Francis J. Argenziano
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APPENDIX A:

Decree of Divorce and Judgment
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Decree of Divorce and Jud9V2S»u^Ji

064401133

Name:
Address:
Phone:
Pro Se

OUR 1

•I

111 11
JD205S3925
RELLER.KARINE ANESiA SCHL.AG
RELLfcK,!

SEK 2
Wcgt

JORDAN DEP1

Micah John Reller
6254 South 5130 West
West Jordan, Ut 84084
801-633-9689

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
West Jordan District Court, 8080 S. Redwood Road, Suite 1701, West Jordan, UT 84088

Micah John Reller,
Petitioner,
vs.
Karine Anesia Schlagel Toledo Reller,
Respondent.

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

DECREE OF DIVORCE
AND JUDGMENT

CaseNo.QfpWr>l(Sg)
Commissioner:

Judge: -XJLU

The above-entitled matter came on before the court on Petitioner's Affidavit for Entry of
Divorce Decree in accordance with Rule 104, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The parties have
completed the class entitled, "Shared Parenting for Divorcing Parents" or have a signed order
waiving the class onfilewith the court. The Court, having found and entered its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and being otherwise fully advised, it is hereby,
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
That the Petitioner is awarded a Decree of Divorcefromthe Respondent, to become final
upon signature and entry.
1. The personal property of the parties is distributed as follows:
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Description of Item
1999 Jeep Cherokee
2000 Toyota Echo
Kitchen Table
Red Sofa Set
| Green Sofa Set
2 Small TVs
Toshiba Laptop
3 picture and video cameras
Washer and Dryer
All Game and Game systems, DVD Movies

Item Becomes Sole Property of
Respondent
Petitioner
Respondent
Respondent
Respondent
Respondent
Respondent
Respondent
Respondent
Petitioner

j

1
1
I
1
|

All other personal property is divided as the parties have already divided it.
2. Each party is ordered to assume and pay debts and hold the other harmless from liability
as follows:
To Whom Debt is Owed

Description of Debt

Petitioner
Will Pay

Respondent
Will Pay

All Debt and profit will be
divided %50 among the both
of us
All other debts are the responsibility of the person incurring the debt.
3. During the course of the marriage, the parties acquired the following real property:
a. A home located at 6245 South 5130 West, West Jordan, UTAH 84084
more particularly described by the following legal description: 3 bedroom, 2 bath 2
family rooms white House with green grass
b. The real property is divided between the parties as follows: We are going
to live in the house for at least 6 months. Paying off some of the debt and saving
money. When both parties are ready to leave then we will sell the house and pay off
the debt the we have aquired thoughout the marriage.
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4. Neither part}' is awarded alimonyfromthe other.
5. The parties have not acquired any interest in any retirement program (including military
retirement), nor have they acquired any interest in any pension or profit sharing plan during the
course of the marriage.
6. There has/have been 1 child(ren) born of this marriage:
NAME
Anna-Elise Schlagel Toledo Reller

DATE OF BIRTH
4/12/2005

6.1 Both parents are awarded the joint legal custody of the minor children, but the
Respondent is awarded the sole physical custody of the children, subject to the Petitioner's right to
parent-time with the children at reasonable times and places. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
30-3-10.1 et seq., the following parenting plan is ordered by the court:
a. The parents will discuss with each other and mutually decide the significant
decisions regarding the child(ren), including, but not limited to, the child(ren)'s education,
health care, and religious upbringing. Either parent may make emergency decisions
regarding the health or safety of the child(ren).
b. Day to day decisions regarding the care, control and discipline of the parties'
child(ren) will be made by the parent with whom the child(ren) resides/are residing at the
time.
c. Any parental duties or rights not specifically addressed in this plan shall be
discussed and mutually decided by both parents.
d. Should the parties have a dispute regarding parenting of the chiid(ren), the
Respondent will make thefinaldecision.
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e. Should either parent feel that a decision made under paragraphs a, b, c, and d
above is contrary to the best interests of the child(ren), that parent may arrange for
mediation of the matter through a mutually agreed upon mediator or mediation service.
Should the parlies be unable to agree upon a mediator or mediation service, the parent
requesting mediation will arrange for mediation through a court-approved mediation
service. A written record shall be prepared of any agreement reached in mediation and a
copy provided to each party. The parent requesting mediation is responsible for the costs of
mediation, unless no agreement is reached in the mediation process, in which case the
parents shall share the costs of mediation equally. No dispute may be presented to the Court
in this matter without a good faith attempt by both parents to resolve the issue through
mediation. If the courtfindsthat a parent has used orfrustratedthe dispute resolution
process without good reason, the court may award attorney's fees andfinancialsanctions to
the prevailing parent. The Court has the right of reviewfromthe mediation process.
f In addition to the terms set out in paragraphs a. through e. above, the court orders
the following provisions be part of the parties' parenting plan: No additional provisions.
g. If a parent fails to comply with a provision of this parenting plan, the other
parent's obligations under the parenting plan are not affected.
7. If the parties reside in the same state and within 150 miles of each other, reasonable
parent-time shall be as the parties agree. If the parties do not agree, the following schedule shall be
considered the minimum parent-time to which the noncustodial parent and the child shall be entitled:
FOR CHILDREN UNDER 5 MONTHS OF AGE:
Weekly:
Six hours of parent-time per week, specified by the court or the noncustodial parent
preferably, divided into three parent-time periods and to take place in the custodial
home, established child care setting or other environment familiar to the child.
Holidays:
Two hours on the holidays indicated on Holiday Schedule below, to take place
preferably in the custodial home, established child care setting or other environment
familiar to the child.
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FOR CHILDREN 5 MONTHS TO UNDER 10 MONTHS OF AGE:
Weekly:
Nine hours of parent-time per week, specified by the court or the noncustodial parent
preferably, divided into three parent-time periods and to take place in the custodial
home, established child care setting or other environment familiar to the child.
Holidays:
Two hours on the holidays indicated on Holiday Schedule below, to take place
preferably in the custodial home, established child care setting or other environment
familiar to the child.
FOR CHILDREN 10 MONTHS TO UNDER 18 MONTHS OF AGE:
Weekly:
One 8 hour visit per week to be specified by the noncustodial parent or the court; and
One 3 hour visit per week to be specified by the noncustodial parent or the court.
Holidays:
Eight hours on the holidays indicated on Holiday Schedule below, and
Telephone contact: Brief phone contact with noncustodial parent at least two times per week.
FOR CHILDREN 18 MONTHS TO UNDER 3 YEARS OF AGE:
Midweek:
One weekday evening for two hours between 5:30 - 8:30 p.m. to be specified by the
noncustodial parent or the court.
Alternate Weekends: Beginning on the first weekend after the entry of the decree from 6:00 p.m.
Friday until 7:00 p.m. Sunday continuing each year.
Holiday Parent-time: Holidays as specified on Holiday Schedule below.
Extended Parent-time: Two one-week periods, separated by at least four weeks, at the option of the
noncustodial parent;
a.
one week shall be uninterrupted time for the noncustodial parent;
b.
the remaining week shall be subject to parent-time for the custodial
parent consistent with these guidelines; and
c.
the custodial parent shall have an identical one-week period of
uninterrupted time for vacation.
Notification of extended parent-time or vacation weeks with (he child shall be
provided at least 30 days in advance to the other parent.
Telephone contact:
Brief phone contact with noncustodial parent at least two times per week.

FOR CHILDREN 3 YEARS TO UNDER 5 YEARS OF AGE:
Midweek:

One weekday evening from 5:30 - 8:30 p.m. to be specified by the noncustodial
parent or court.
Alternate Weekends: Beginning on the first weekend after the entry of the decree from
6:00 p.m. on Friday until 7:00 p.m. on Sunday continuing each year.
Holiday Parent-time: Holidays as specified on Holiday Schedule below.
Extended Parent-time: Two two-week periods, separated by at least four weeks, at the option of the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Telephone contact:

noncustodial parent;
a.
one two-week period shall be uninterrupted time for the
noncustodial parent;
b.
the remaining two-week period shall be subject to parent-time
for the custodial parent consistent to these guidelines; and
c.
the custodial parent shall have an identical two-week period
of uninterrupted time for vacation.
A parent shall notify the other parent at least 30 days in advance of extended
parent-time or vacation weeks.
Shall be at reasonable hours and for reasonable duration.

FOR CHILDREN 5 YEARS TO 18 YEARS OF AGE:
Midweek:
One weekday evening to be specified by the noncustodial parent or the courtfrom5:30
-8:30 p.m.
Alternate Weekends: Beginning on the first weekend after the entry of the decree from
6:00 p.m. on Friday until 7:00 p.m. on Sunday continuing each year.
Holiday Parent-time: Holidays as specified on Holiday Schedule below.
Extended Parent-time:
Extended parent-time with the noncustodial parent may be up to four
weeks consecutive at the option of the noncustodial parent;
a.
two weeks shall be uninterrupted time for the noncustodial
parent;
b.
the remaining two weeks shall be subject to parent-time for the
custodial parent consistent to these guidelines; and
c.
the custodial parent shall have an identical two-week period of
uninterrupted time during the children's summer vacation from
school for purposes of vacation.
If the child is enrolled in year-round school, the noncustodial parent's
extended parent-time shall be lA of the vacation time for year-round school
breaks, provided the custodial parent lias holiday and phone visits;
Notification of extended parent-time or vacation weeks with the child shall be
provided at least 30 days in advance to the other parent.
Telephone contact:
Shall be at reasonable hours and for reasonable duration.

HOLIDAY SCHEDULE FOR NONCUSTODIAL PARENTS
• Holidays take precedence over the weekend parent-time, and changes shall not be made in the regular
rotation of the alternating weekend parent-time schedule.
• If a holiday falls
on a regular
scheduled
school
theJ. noncustodial
parent
shall
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cliild's attendance at school for that school day.
• If a holiday falls on a weekend or on a Friday or Monday and the total holiday period extends beyond that
time so that the child is free from school and die parent is free from work, the noncustodial parent is entitled
to tins lengthier holiday period.
Odd Numbered Years

Even Numbered Years

Child's birthday, on the day before or after
the actual birthdate from 3 p.m. to 9 p.m.

Child1 s birthday on the actual birthdate
from 3 p.m. to 9 p.m.

Note: At the discretion of the noncustodial parent, that parent may take otlier siblings along for the birtliday.
Human Rights Day - 6 p.m. the day
before until 7 p.m. on the holiday

Presidents Day - from 6 p.m. day before
until 7 p.m. on the holiday

Easter - from 6 p.m. Fri. until Sun. 7 p.m.
unless holiday extends for lengthier period of
time to which parent is completely entitled

July 4th - from 6 p.m. day before until
11:00 p.m. on the holiday

Memorial Day - from 6 p.m. Fri. until Mon.
Labor Day - from 6 p.m. Fri. until Mon. at
7 p.m. unless holiday extends for lengthier period7 p.m. unless the holiday extends for lengthier
of time to which parent is completely entitled
period of time to which parent is entitled
July 24th - from 6 p.m. day before until
11 p.m. on the holiday

Veterans Day - from 6 p.m. the day before
until 11 p.m. on the holiday

UEA weekend (Fall break) - from 6 p.m. Wed.
until Sun. 7 p.m. unless holiday extends for
lengthier period of time to which parent is
entitled
Columbus Day - from 6 p.m. day before until
7 p.m. on the holiday
Thanksgiving - from Wed. 7 p.m. to Sun.
7 p.m.

Christmas School Vacation: means the time period beginning on the evening the cliild gets out of school for
the Cliristmas school break until the evening before the children return to school, except for Cliristmas Eve,
Cliristmas Day and New Year's Day:
Christmas - first portion of school vacation
plus Cliristmas Eve and Cliristmas Day until
1 p.m. so that entire holiday is equally divided

Christmas Vacation - second portion of school
vacation plus Cliristmas day from 1 p.m. until
9 p.m. the day before children return to school so
that entire holiday is equally divided

Father's Day: with natural or adoptive father every year from 9 a.m. to 7 p.m. on holiday
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Mother's Day: with natural or adoptive mother every year from 9 a.m. to 7 p.m. on holiday
FOR ALL CHILDREN:
• Special consideration shall be given by each parent to make the children) available to attend family
functions including funerals, weddings, family reunions, religious holidays, important ceremonies, and
other significant events in the life of the children) or in the life of either parent which may inadvertently
conflict with the parent-time schedule.
• The noncustodial parent shall pick up the children) at the times specified and return the children) at the
times specified, and the child's regular school hours shall not be interrupted.
• The custodial parent shall have the child ready for parent-time at the time the children) are to be picked
up and sliall be present at the custodial home or shall make reasonable alternate arrangements to receive the
child(ren) at the time they are returned.
• Neither parent-time nor child support is to be withheld due to either parent's failure to comply with a
court-ordered parent-time schedule.
• The custodial parent shall notify the noncustodial parent within 24 hours of receiving notice of all
significant school, social, sports, and community functions in which the child is participating or being
honored, and the noncustodial parent shall be entitled to attend and participate fully.
• The noncustodial parent sliall have access directly to all school reports including preschool and daycare
reports and medical records and shall be notified immediately by the custodial parent in the event of a
medical emergency.
• Each parent shall provide the other with his or her current address and telephone number within 24 hours
of any change.
• Each parent shall permit and encourage liberal telephone contact during reasonable hours and uncensored
mail privileges with the child.
• Each parent shall be entitled to an equal division of major religious holidays celebrated by the parents, and
the parent who celebrates a religious holiday that the otlier parent does not celebrate shall have the riglit to
be together with the child on the religious holiday.
• When parent-time has not taken place for an extended period of time and the childfren) lack an
appropriate bond with the noncustodial parent, both parents shall consider the possible adverse effects on
the child(ren) and gradually reintroduce an appropriate parent-time plan for the noncustodial parent.
• For emergency purposes, whenever the children) travel with either parent, all of the following will be
provided to the otlier parent:
a.
b.

an itinerary of travel dates;
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c.
d.

places where the cliild or traveling parent can be reached; and
the name and telephone number of an available third person who would be
knowledgeable of the cliild(ren)'s location.

• A cliild under the age of five shall not travel unchaperoned.
FOR DAY CARE:
• Parental care shall be presumed to be better care for the cliild than surrogate care and the parties shall
cooperate in allowing the noncustodial parent, if willing and able, to provide cliild care.
• Each parent shall provide all surrogate care providers with the name, current address, and telephone
number of the other parent and shall provide the noncustodial parent with the name, current address, and
telephone number of all surrogate care providers.
7.1. Petitioner will pick up, deliver and return the children for all parent time unless the
parties make other arrangements.
7.2 If either party moves from the state of Utah or 150 miles or more from their residence
specified in the Court's Decree, that parent shall provide if possible 60 days advance written notice
of the intended relocation to the other parent. The written notice of relocation shall contain
statements affinning that:
a. the parent-time provisions in Utah Code § 30-3-37(5) or a schedule approved by
both parties will be followed; and
b. neither parent will interfere with the other's parental rights pursuant to court
ordered parent-time arrangements, or the schedule approved by both parties.
A parent who fails to comply with the notice of relocation shall be in contempt of the Court's
order.
7.3 If either parent lives more than 150 miles away from the other parent or if both parents
live in separate states or countries, parent time shall be as the parties agree. If they are unable to
agree, the following shall be the minimum parent-time allowed to the non-custodial parent:
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Micah can pick up, see and be with her anytime or anyday Unless Karine has plans that day.
Karine or Micah can move to a diferent state or country with the permission of the other when
taking the child over state borders.
1A If either parent lives more than 150 miles awayfromthe other parent or if both parents
live in separate states, costs for their child(ren)'s travel expenses for parent-time shall be shared
equally by the parents.
a. If the noncustodial parent has been found in contempt for not being current on all
support obligations, that parent shall be responsible for all of the child's travel expenses
relating to the parent time schedule in this order.
b. Reimbursement by either responsible party to the other for the child's travel
expenses shall be made within 30 days of receipt of documents detailing those expenses.
8. Pursuant to Utah Code § 78-45-7.5 Petitioner's total countable gross monthly income for
child support purposes is $4,000.00. Petitioner's base child support amount using the sole custody
calculation is $373.62 per month. The Petitioner receives the following gross monthly income from
all sources:
a. The Petitioner is employed at Johnny Carinos

Breckenridge Group and

grosses $4,000.00 per month working the equivalent of one full-time 40-hour a week job or
less.
8.1 Pursuant to Utah Code § 78-45-7.5 Respondent's total countable gross monthly income
for child support.purposes is $936.00. Respondent's base child support amount using the sole
custody calculation is $105.38 per month. The Respondent receives the following gross monthly
incomefromall sources:
a. The Respondent is employed at Self Employed

Reller Cleaning and grosses

$936.00 per month working the equivalent of one full-time 40-hour a week job or less.
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8.2 Pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-45-7 et seq. (1953 as amended) the Petitioner is ordered to
to the Respondent as and for child support:
a. A sum of not less than $373.62 per month as base support for the minor child(ren)
of the parties, pursuant to the Uniform Child Support Guidelines until said child(ren)
become 18 years of age, or have graduated from high school during the child(ren)'s normal
and expected year of graduation, whichever occurs later.
b. Child support payments shall begin the month immediately folio wing the entry of
the order for child support. The monthly child support shall be paid one half on or before the
5th day of each month, and the other half on or before the 20th day of each month, unless the
custodial parent uses the Office of Recovery Services to collect support. Child support due
and not paid on or before the 5th day of the month is delinquent on the 6th day of the month.
Child support due and not paid on or before the 20th day of the month is delinquent on the
21st day of the month.
c. The sole custody worksheet was used in calculating the child support in this
matter. Petitioner's base child support amount is $373.62 per month. Respondent's base
child support amount is $105.38 per month. If the physical living arrangements of a child
changes from what is ordered (not including temporary changes for parent-time or
visitation), then pursuant to Utah Code § 78-45-4.4 a parent whom the child is not residing
with is required to pay to whoever the child is residing with the amount of support set out
above for that parent and described as ctthe base child support amount." The parent shall
automatically begin paying this base support amount without the need to modify this child
support order.
d. The sole physical custody worksheet was used in calculating the base child
support award. The base child support award shall be reduced by 50% for each minor child
for time periods during which such minor child is with the non-custodial parent by court
order or written
agreement
signed
by the
for
at least
any BYU.
30 consecutive days.
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The base child support award shall be reduced by 25% for each minor child for time periods
during which such minor child is with the non-custodial parent by court order or written
agreement signed by the parties for at least 12 of any 30 consecutive days. Normal
parent-time and holiday parent-time with the custodial parent shall not be considered an
interruption of the consecutive day requirement for the non-custodial parent. If the
dependent child is a recipient of cash assistancefromthe state of Utah through the T. A.N.F.
or F.E.P. programs, any agreement by the parties for reduction of child support during
extended parent-time shall be approved by the Office of Recovery Services.
e. The person entitled to receive child support shall be entitled to mandatory income
withholding relief pursuant to U.C.A. § 62A-11 parts 4 and 5 (1953 as amended), and any
Federal and State tax refunds or rebates due the non-custodial parent may be intercepted by
the State of Utah and applied to existing cliild support arrearages. This income withholding
procedure shall apply to existing and future payors. All withheld income shall be submitted
to the Office of Recovery Sendees until such time as the non-custodial parent no longer
owes cliild support to the person entitled to receive child support. All child support
payments shall be made to the Office of Recovery Services, P.O. Box 45011, Salt Lake City,
UT 84145-011, unless the Office of Recovery Services gives notice that payments should be
sent elsewhere. Should mandatory income withholding be implemented by the Office of
Recovery Services, child support shall be due on thefirstday of each month and delinquent
on the first day of the following month. All administrative fees and costs of income
withholding assessed by the Office of Recovery Sendees shall be paid by the non-custodial
parent in addition to the base child support obligation.
f. The issue of child support arrearages may be determined by further judicial or
administrative process.
g. Each of the parties is under mutual obligation to notify the other within ten (10)
days of any change in monthly income.
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h. Under Utah Code §§ 78-45-7.2(6) and (8), the parties have a right to modify this
child support order after three yearsfromthe date of its entry if upon review there is a
difference of 10% or more between the amount previously ordered and the new amount of
child support, calculated using the appropriate child support worksheet, and the difference is
not of a temporary nature.
i. Under Utah Code §§ 78-45-7.2(7) and (8), the parties have a right to modify this
child support order at any time if there has been a substantial change in circumstances
because of: (i) material changes in custody; (ii) material changes in the relative wealth or
assets of the parties; (iii) material changes of 30% or more in the income of a parent; (iv)
material changes in the ability of a parent to earn; (v) material changes in the medical needs
of the child; and (vi) material changes in the legal responsibilities of either parent for the
support of others, and, the change in (i) through (vi) results in a 15% or more difference
between the amount previously ordered and the new amount of child support, calculated
using the appropriate child support worksheet, and the difference is not of a temporary
nature. In a proceeding to modify an existing award, consideration of natural or adoptive
children other than those in common to both parties may be applied to mitigate an increase in
the child support award, but may not be applied to justify a decrease in the award.
8.3 The Respondent is entitled to claim the parties' minor child(ren) as dependent(s) for tax
purposes.
8.4 Pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-45-7.15 (1953) as amended:
a. Petitioner is required to maintain insurance for medical expenses for the benefit of
the minor children where available at reasonable cost.
b. Both parties shall share equally the out-of-pocket costs of the premium actually
paid by a parent for the children's portion of the insurance.
c. Both
parties shall share equally all reasonable and necessary uninsured medical
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expenses, including deductibles and co-payments, incurred for the minor children and
actually paid by the parties.
d. The parent who incurs medical expenses shall provide written verification of the
cost and payment of medical expenses to the other parent within 30 days of payment.
e. A parent incurring medical expenses may be denied the right to receive credit for
the expenses or to recover the other parent's share of the expenses if that parent fails to
comply with the Subparagraph "dM above.
9. Both parties are ordered to sign and fully execute whatever documents are necessary for
the implementation of the provisions of this divorce decree. Should a party fail to execute a
document within 60 days of the entry of this divorce decree, the other party may bring an Order to
Show Cause at the expense of the disobedient part)7 and seek that the Court appoint some other
person to execute the document pursuant to Rule 70 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Any
document executed pursuant to Rule 70 has the same effect as if executed by the disobedient party.
10. Prior to any Petition beingfiledto change any provision of thefinalDecree of Divorce,
the parties must attempt to resolve the issue through mediation.

DATED this

\Z

day of

S^wK.

, 2a&$
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Approved as to form:

v/1

'

-^h*

JIKA/Y\1.
XiJMh
Respondent's Signature

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY
On this 5>Q

day of v AkK/rvo, VJ >

, c2£Q5 a t r u e and correct copy of the

foregoing Decree of Divorce and Judgment was mailed, postage prepaid or delivered to Respondent
at:
Karine Anesia Schlagel Toledo Reller
6254 South 5130 West
West Jordan, Ut 84084
Petitioner Signature
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3 RD DISTRICT CT - WEST JORDAN
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MICAH JOHN RELLER,
Petitioner,

RECOMMENDATION
HEARING March 13, 2008
Case No: 064401133

vs.
KARINE ANESIA SCHLAGEL,
Respondent and Third
Party Petitioner,

Judge: Terry Christiansen
Commissioner: MICHELLE TACK

FRANCIS J. ARGENZIANO,
Third Party Respondent.

After the hearing on March 13, 2008, the court took under advisement the Third Party
Respondent's Motion to Vacate the Order Joining Francis Joseph Argenziano and to Dismiss
Respondent's Amended Petition to Modify. Having reviewed the pleadings and the relevant case
law and statutes and adopting the undisputed facts as stated by the Third Party Respondent in his
Memorandum of January 3, 2008, the Commissioner makes the following recommendations:
1.

Petitioner is presumed to be the father of Anna-Elise Schlagel Toledo Reller
pursuant to §78-45g-204 of the Utah Code because Petitioner and Respondent
were married to each other when the child was born on April 12, 2005.

2.

Petitioner was adjudicated as the child's father at the entry of the parties' Decree
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of Divorce on or about September 12, 2006, pursuant to §78-45g-623(3) of the
Utah Code.
3.

Pursuant to §78-45g-623(6) of the Utah Code, ua party to an adjudication of
paternity may challenge the adjudication only under the law of this state relating
to appeal, vacation of judgments, or other judicial review."

4.

The question currently before the court is limited only to whether Respondent's
Amended Petition to Modify is properly before the Court and whether the Order
Joining the Third Party Respondent should be vacated.

5.

Respondent seeks to undo the adjudication of paternity of the minor child AnnaElise Schlagel Toledo Reller by means of a Petition to Modify alleging a change
of circumstance. There has been no change of circumstance and the Respondent,
who knew of the existence of this issue at the time of the parties' divorce and
failed to raise the issue, is now estopped from challenging the adjudication of
paternity.

6.

Based upon the adjudication of paternity within the parties' Decree of Divorce,
the issue of paternity is not properly before this court and therefore this court
currently lacks jurisdiction over the Third Party Respondent, Francis Joseph
Argenziano.

7.

Unless and until the court grants relief from the judgment adjudicating paternity,
the Petitioner and Respondent are bound by the existing order of this court.

8.

The Third Party Respondent's Motion to Dismiss Respondent's Amended Petition
to Modify is granted as Respondent is estopped from raising the issue of paternity
under the current order and therefore has failed to state a claim upon which relief
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may be granted .
9.

Based upon the recommendation to dismiss the Respondent's Amended Petition
to Modify, this court currently lacks jurisdiction over the Third Party Respondent
and the Order Joining Francis Joseph Argenziano is vacated.

10.

If the existing adjudication of paternity was vacated, set aside, terminated, or
dissolved in any maimer under the laws of this state, then this court would have
jurisdiction under the Utah Uniform Parentage Act to consider the issue of
paternity and the respective rights and obligations of all parties under the relevant
provisions of the Utah Code.

This recommendation is the Order of the Court until modified by the Court. Parties may object
to this recommendation within ten days after service pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.

Recommended this 3($

day of May, 2008.
./**?"
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 064401133 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail

Mail

NAME
KARINE ANESIA SCHLAG RELLER
Respondent
6254 S 5130 W
WEST JORDAN, UT 84084
JAMES A MCINTYRE
Attorney
383 8 S W TEMPLE STE 3
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84115
TIMOTHY W STEWART
Attorney PET
5295 S COMMERCE DR STE 200
MURRAY UT 84107

MAY 112008
Dated this

day of

, 20

.

Deputy Court Cler
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PRIOR HISTORY: [*1]
Third District; Salt Lake Department, 044904183. The Honorable Denise P. Lindberg.
Bryner v. Bryner, 2008 UT App 238, 2008 Utah App, LEXIS 237 (2008)
CASE

S U M

|

M A R

Y

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: In child custody proceedings, appellant father appealed tl \e judgii iei it
entered in the Third District, Salt Lake Department, Utah, regarding cross- mot ions for
enforcement of a settlement agreement.
OVERVIEW: The parties engaged in mediation and agreed to a settlement. Both tl le fathei and
mother filed cross-motions to enforce their versions of the settlement agreement,. The district
court discovered that the father had obtained a civil stalking injunction against the mother, and
that it could not enforce the parties' stipulated joint legal and physical custody arrangement
without receiving additional evidence regarding the children's best interests. The district court
found that it would violate public policy to adopt an arbitration clause that allow an arbitrator
to determine child custody. On appeal, the father claimed that because the arbitration clause
was unenforceable, none of the other agreements reached by the parties could be enforced.
Because the issue was not raised in the district court, it was not preserved for appeal. Even so,
the Court of Appeals of Utah held that the district court acted within its discretior to adop*
some but: not all, of the parties' agreements.
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OPINION

MEMORANDUM DECISION
PhR CURIAM:
This appeal is taken following a final judgment in the child custody proceedings involving Roger
Bryner (Father) and Svetlana Bryner (Mother). Father appeals a May 8, 2006 judgment regarding
cross-motions for enforcement of a settlement agreement. He does not, however, challenge the
child custody determination made by the district court in the final judgment entered on May 8,
2008. Therefore, he has neither argued nor demonstrated that the district court's decision on child

custody is not supported by sufficient evidence or is not in the children's best interests.
On November 10, 2005, the parties engaged in mediation and agreed to a settiemei it. The
settlement agreement was not reduced to writing, and the recording equipment malfunctioned.
The parties met again on Decembers, 2005, in an effort to reconstitute the settlement
agreement. After efforts to agree on all issues were unsuccessful, both Father [*2] and Mother
filed cross-motions to enforce their versions of the settlement agreement. At a February 28, 2006
evidentiary hearing on the cross-motions, the parties reached a number of agreements on the
record. On May 8, 2006, the district court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Judgment on Cross-Motions.
After the February 28 hearing but before entry of the May 8, 2006 judgment, the district court
discovered that Father obtained an ex parte civil stalking injunction against Mother on the day
before the hearing but had failed to inform Mother or the district court of that fact, Based on that
information, the district court determined that it could not determine the advisability of enforcing
the parties' stipulated joint legal and physical custody arrangement without receiving additional
evidence regarding the children's best interests. Therefore, the district court: ordered that the
issue of child custody would proceed to trial. The district court adopted the parties' otheragreements as stated on the record at the February 28, 2006 hearing. Additionally, the district
court found that it would violate public policy to adopt an arbitration clause that would substitute
[*3] an arbitrator for the district court to determine child custody. Accordingly, the district court
ruled that any requirement to arbitrate would be limited to issues that did not pertain to the
children. The district court entered a final judgment on May 8, 2008, after a trial on the remaining
child custody issues. In that judgment, the district court granted sole legal custody of the children
to Mother but granted joint physical custody to Mother and Father.
The focus of Father's brief on appeal is an alleged agreement within tl le settlement agreement to
submit child custody issues to arbitration. Father claims that because such an agreement would be
unenforceable, none of the other agreements reached by the parties can be enforced. The issue
Father raises on appeal--that either all or none of the stipulations reached by the parties must be
enforced--was not preserved in the district court. Father cites his trial brief, prepared in advance
of the February 28, 2006 hearing, for preservation of the issue regarding selective or partial
enforcement of the stipulated settlement. However, while the trial brief opposed the arbitration of
child custody issues, it did not raise any issue regarding [*4] partial enforcement of the stipulated
settlement. In addition, Father did not raise any issue regarding partial or selective enforcement of
the agreement through a timely objection in the district court following the May 8, 2006 judgment.
Because the issue raised on appeal was not first raised in the district court, it was not preserved
for appeal. ra?"[A]s a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on
appeal." Tschaggeny v. MiibankIns. Co.., 2007 UT 37, P20, 163 P.3d 615.
Even assuming that the issue had been preserved, the district court was within its discretion to
adopt some but not all, of the parties' agreements. HN2 + "[A] stipulation pertaining to matters of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the court. Klein v. Klein, 544 P.2d 472, 476 (Utah 1975). "It is only a recommendation to be
adhered to if the court believes it to be fair and reasonable." Id, Father's argument is simply that,
as a matter of contract law, the agreement of the parties cannot be enforced except as a
complete agreement. [*5] However, HN3*+the parties may not remove an issue from the court
hearing a divorce or custody matter by contract. See Diener v. Diener, 2004 UT App 314, P 5, 98
P.3d 1178 (stating that a district court had authority to enter judgment for child support as
appears reasonable and to modify such judgments "regardless of attempts by the parties to control
the matter by contract"); see also Sill v. Sill, 2007 UT App 173, P 9, 154 P.3d 415 (ruling that a
non-modification provision of a settlement agreement did not divest the district court of statutory
continuing jurisdiction to make orders based upon a material change of circumstances); id. P 23
(Orme, J . , concurring) (stating that
matter jurisdiction").

HN4r u

? the parties cannot stipulate away a court's subject

Accordingly, we affirm.
Pamela T. Greenwood • ,
Presiding Judge
Gregory K. Orme • , Judge
Carolyn B. McHugh ^, Judge
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Butler v. Brownlee, 152 Mont 453, 451 P.2d 836 (Mont 1969)
152 Mont. 453 (Mont 1969)
451 P.2d 836
Beverly Jeanne BUTLER, Petitioner,
v.
Honorable IE. Gardnei BROWNLbk, Judge ol thi.> Disti ict. Court
of the 4th Judicial District, In and For the
Coi II itv oi ' Missoi slajr Respoi id ESI it
No. 11628.
Supiemc-* Coil. I nil" M n n U n
March 20, 1969
'

Si ibmitted Feb. 17 , 1969,,,

[451 P.2d 837]

Page 4 5 4
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Great P -

;
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Leonard J . Haxby (argued), ;:rutk-;; for respondent.
I IASVVEIL, Justice,,
1his is an application for a writ of review of proceedings resulting in modification of a divorce decree in
the disti ict court of Missoula County.
Ml proceedings herein questioned were taken in civil cause #27420,. a divorce action in the district
court. The district court file discloses that the husband filed a complaint for divorce against, his wife alleging,
among other things, that two named minor children were born as issue of the marriage. The husbaiid w a s
granted a default divorce by decree dated July 6, 1964. In that decree the court found that the two named minor
children were born a s issue of the marriage, awarded their custody to the wife, and ordered the husband to pay
the wife $100.00 per month for their support.
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More than four years later the husband, following attempts to collect child support from him, filed a 'Motion
for Modification of Divorce Decree' alleging that he 'now has satisfactory proof that the two children as noted in
the decree' are not his issue. The motion requested 'that a modification of said divorce decree be entered and
that it shall be noted that there were no children born as issue of subject marriage and that from henceforth the
plaintiff be freed from paying the sum of One Hundred Dollars ($100.00) per month or any support to the
defendant herein.'
The motion was set for hearing on September 27, 1968, the wife did not appear, her default was
entered, and testimony was received in support of the motion. On October 3, 1968, the district court entered its
order finding that the two named minor children were not issue of the marriage and absolved the husband from
making any further support payment for them.
On October 14, 1968, the wife filed her motion to set aside the order of October 3. The husband
moved to quash the wife's motion. The district court ordered 'a full hearing on the facts to determine whether or
not the order made on the 3rd day of October, 1968 should remain as entered.'
This hearing was held on February 3, 1969 with both parties appearing personally with their respective
attorneys. Testimony was taken, the matter taken under advisement, and on February 10 the district court
entered its final order.
This order recited that the husband presented proof at the February 3 hearing showing that the two
minor children involved were not his children and that the wife presented no proof whatever on this subject. The
court concluded that nothing had been presented to it which would justify any change in its previous order of
October 3 except that the husband should be required to pay past due and delinquent child support payments
provided in the original divorce decree at the rate of $40.00 per month for five years.
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The wife then filed a petition for writ of review with this Court. Following ex parte presentation, an order to
show cause was issued. On the day set for hearing and immediately prior thereto, the husband filed a motion to
quash and an answer to the wife's petition.
Although the husband's answer categorically denied every allegation in the wife's petition except the
status of the presiding district court judge, the husband's attorney advised this Court upon oral argument that the
factual allegations regarding events that transpired in the district court were not denied but only the legal
conclusions contained in the wife's petition. We will treat the answer accordingly.
[451 P.2d 838]

The gist of the wife's argument is that a writ of review is an available remedy here

because the district court exceeded its jurisdiction in determining the paternity of the two minor children, and that
the remedy by appeal is neither speedy nor adequate. The husband, on the other hand, contends that a writ of
review will not lie because the district court did not exceed its jurisdiction in determining paternity, and the wife's
remedy by appeal precludes issuance of a writ of review.
Initially we must determine whether the district court exceeded its jurisdiction in determining the
paternity of the two Digitized
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husband's
motion
forClark
modification
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We note that the paternity of the two minor children was placed in issue by the husband's own
allegations in his divorce complaint. He alleged therein that these children were born as issue of tl ie marriage,.
He alone testified in support of the allegations of his complaint. The divorce decree recited that it appeared to
the court 'that two children have been born as a result of said marriage' naming them, and that the husband
'sustained the allegations of his complaint by competent evidence * * *',„ The divorce decree provided, among
other things, 'that the defendant is hereby awarded the care, custody and control of the minor children of the
parties hereto' and named them. The husband was ordered to pay a sum certain

for tl leir support.. There was no appeal from the divorce decree.
It is undoubtedly true that a district court which enters a divorce decree retains continuir ig jurisdictior i
to modify child custody and child support awards contained therein. Section 21-138, R.CM.1947; Barboui v.
Barbour, 134 Mont:,,, 317, 330 R2d 1093., The purpose of this continuing jurisdiction is to enable the court to
adjust custody and child support provisions to meet: changing conditions that develop after entry of the original
award; and it is on the basis of a, material change if I conditions from those existing at the time of tl ie original
award that modifications are made. Trudgen v. Trudgen, 134 Mont. 174, 329 P.2d 225,. Common examples of
such changing conditions are the remarriage of one or both parents, changes in health or financial circumstances
of the parents, and the changing needs and desires of the minor children
lhi i the instant case, however, the modification of the original child support, award is not based on any
change if i conditions that has occurred since the original decree. On the contrary it is based on an alleged fact
that predated the original decree. In essence the husband seeks to relitigate an issue adjudicated in the oiiginall
decree, viz. the paternity of the minor children.
A judgment not appealed from is conclusive between the parties as to all issues raised by pleadings
actually litigated and adjudged as shown on the face of the judgment and reasonably determined in order to
reach the conclusion announced. Doull v. Wohlschlager, 141 Mont. 354, 377 R2d 758; Missoula L ight & Water
Co. v. Hughes, 106 Mont. 355, 77 R2d 1041. Although this rule has not heretofore been directly applied by this
Court to determination of paternity of minor children in a divorce decree, other jurisdictions hold that under such
circumstances the issue of paternity becomes res judicata between the husband and wife under the original
divorce decree. Johns v. Johns, 64 Wash.2d 696, 393 P.2d 948; Limbet g v.
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Limberg, 10 Wis.2d 63, 102 N.Vl .2d 103; Dornfeld v. Domfeld, 200 AD. 38, 192 N.Y.S. 497; 65 A.L R.2d
1395; 24 Am.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, Sec. 877, p. 998. Still other jurisdictions prevent relitigation of the
issue of paternity of minor children under the guise of modification of the original divorce decree for a variety of
reasons without directly using the language of res judicata. Peercy v. Peercy, 154 Colo. 575, 392 R2d 609;
Peck v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 185 Cai.App.2d 573, 8 Cal.Rptr. 561; Sorenson v. Sorenson,
254 Iowa 817, 119 N.W.2d 129.
111 oui view under the circumstances disclosed here, the court's jurisdiction on [451 P.2d 839] the issue
of parentage of the minor children became exhausted upon entry of the original divorce decree, and until that
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Rules 59 and 60, M.R.Civ.R, the court cannot again hear or determine the issue of paternity. As there has been
no appeal from the original decree and as the instant 'Petition for Modification of Divorce Decree' on its face
does not purport to seek relief under Rules 59 or 60, M.R.Civ.R, the district court exceeded its jurisdiction in
hearing and determining the issue of paternity of the two named minor children at the hearings of September 27,
1968 and February 3, 1969, and its resulting orders of October 3, 1968 and February 10, 1969.
We must next determine whether a writ of review is an available remedy to correct the errors of which
the wife complains. At the outset it is abundantly clear that the wife herein has a remedy by appeal. Rule 1 of
the Montana Rules of Appellate Civil Procedure provides in material parts that 'a party aggrieved may appeal
from * * * any special order made after final judgment * * V Its forerunner, section 93-8003, R.C.M.1947, and its
predecessors, provided to like effect. An order modifying a child custody and support award in a divorce decree
is a 'special order made after final judgment'
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within the meaning of the appeal statute. State ex rel. Gates v. District Court, 69 Mont. 322, 221 P. 543;
McVay v. McVayMS Mont. 31, 270 P.2d 393.
This Court has previously held that a writ of review will not lie to correct orders modifying child custody
and support provisions in a divorce decree even though made in excess of jurisdiction because the remedy by
appeal is available. State ex rel. Gates v. District Court, supra.
But must we close our eyes to the need for immediate relief under the circumstances disclosed here?
Not at all.
Looking to substance rather than form, it is apparent that the orders of the district court have rendered
the children illegitimate and cut off their support. The district court exceeded its jurisdiction in entering these
orders. These children are wards of the court. Barbour v. Barbour, supra; State ex rel. Lay v. District Court, 122
Mont. 61, 198 P.2d 761; Wolz v. Wolz, 110 Mont. 458, 102 P.2d 22. The state, as well as the parties to the
divorce action, has an interest in their welfare and in their support. To promote this paramount interest, the state
must act through the instrumentality of the court.
Art. VIII, Sec. 3 of the Montana Constitution grants to this Court the 'power in its discretion to issue
and to hear and determine writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, quo-warranto, certiorari, prohibition and
injunction, and such other original and remedial writs as may be necessary or proper to the complete exercise of
its appellate jurisdiction.' (Emphasis supplied.) Rule 17(a) of the Montana Rules of Appellate Civil Procedure
provides:
The Supreme Court is an appellate court but it is empowered by the Constitution of Montana to hear
and determine such original and remedial writs as may be necessary or proper to the complete exercise of its
jurisdiction. The institution of such original proceedings in the Supreme Court is sometimes justified by
circumstances of an emergency nature, as when
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a cause of action or a right has arisen under conditions making due consideration in the trial courts and due
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necessar \ 01 propei .' (Ei i ipt lasis supplied.)
11 i our view the foregoing constitutes a grant of power to this Court sufficient to authorize the issuance
of an original and remedial writ vacating and setting aside the orders of the district court dated October 3, 1968
and February 10, 1969.,, Let such writ, issue,. It is so ordered,,
JAMES T. HARRISON, C. J . , and CASTLES, JOl IN C. hlARRISONand BONNER, JJ„, concur.
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CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Defendant former husband appealed an order of a district court
(Utah) denying his petition for a modification of a decree of divorce entered in a divorce action
brought by plaintiff wife.
OVERVIEW: The district court found in the divorce action thai the wife was entitled to a
divorce and that the custody of two children of the marriage should be awarded to the wife.
The district court also awarded the wife support for children. The husband did! not appeal the
decree. The husband's petition for modification of the decree alleged that the older child was
another man's son and that he should be relieved of the obligation to further support the ctHid.
On appeal, the court found that the record did not support such a change of circumstances
that would have entitled the husband to have the original decree modified and that it appeared
that the husband was attempting to have the court review the decree of divorce originally
entered after the time for appeal from that decree had expired,
OUTCOME: [lie court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

CORE TERMS: divo; ce, decree, modification, custody, decree of divorce, minor childr en,
marriage, modified

OUNSEL: [**1]
Paul N. Cotro-Mai ies of < mm- Mdiit^, lA/an, hankhouser & Beasley, Salt Lake
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JUDGES: Tuckett, Justice, wrote the opinion. Caliister, C.J., and Henriod, J . , concur. Ellett, Justice
concurring specially. Crockett, J . , concurs in the concurring opinion of Ellett, J .
OPINION BY: TUCKETT
OPINION

[*1235] The defendant appeals from an order of the district court denying his petition for a
modification of the decree of divorce entered in the case. The plaintiff filed her complaint for a
divorce on November 2, 1972, and the defendant did not answer. A hearing was had on December
8, 1972, at which time the defendant was represented by counsel. The court found that the
plaintiff was entitled to a divorce, and further found that the custody of two children of the
marriage, Christian H., two years, and Derek H., one year, should be awarded [*1236] to the
plaintiff subject to the right of the defendant to visit the children at reasonable times. The court
also awarded to the plaintiff support for the minor children. No appeal was taken from the decree
entered.
On March 22, [**2] 1973, the defendant petitioned the court that the plaintiff be deprived of
the custody of the minor children, claiming that the plaintiff was emotionally unstable, and that it
would be in the best interests of the children if custody were awarded to him. After a hearing the
court denied the defendant's petition. On October 3, 1973, the defendant filed a petition for
modification of the decree wherein he alleged that the child Christian was the son of another man
and that he, the defendant, should be relieved of the obligation to further support the child. After
a hearing, the court denied defendant's petition for modification. While there was some evidence
to support the defendant's contention that the child Christian was not his natural child, still the
record does not support such a change of circumstances which would entitle the defendant to
have the original decree modified. It should be noted that the defendant raised no issue of
paternity at the time these proceedings were initiated, nor did the defendant make any such
contention when he sought to have the decree modified so as to award to him the custody of
Christian as well as the other child. It appears to us that the [**3] defendant is attempting in
these proceedings for a modification to have this court review the decree of divorce originally
entered after the time for appeal from that decree has long since expired. The defendant attempts
to have this court review the record in the case of Benevidez v. Zimmerman, which matter appears
to have been tried in the district court. It does not appear from the record that the file in that
case was before the district court in these proceedings, and it has not been made a part of the
record here. That matter cannot be considered by this court.
The decision of the court below is affirmed. Respondent is entitled to costs.
CALLISTER, C.J., and HENRIOD, J . , concur.
CONCUPv BY: ELLETT
CONCUR

ELLETT, Justice (concurring specially).
I concur, but with the observation that the failure of the defendant to include the Zimmerman
record does not affect this decision. x It would have been proper evidence in the divorce action,
but it would not give any proof of a "change in circumstances" so as to justify a modification of
the original divorce decree.
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i It is claimed that the case of Zimmerman established that he was the father of the
illegitimate child born to plaintiff prior to her second marriage to the defendant. No issue was
raised at the divorce trial as to legitimacy, and the court there found that defendant was the
father of the child. No appeal was taken from that ruling, and the defendant cannot under the
claim of a change in circumstances relitigate the divorce case.
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